Introduction
In a frictionless world market, firms are indifferent to the trading location of their securities.
However, frictions, such as cross-border barriers to investments (Black, 1974; Solnik, 1974; Stulz, 1981; Errunza and Losq, 1985) and information flow (Merton, 1987; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) , as well as market differences in liquidity (Tinic and West, 1974; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Domowitz et al., 1998; Werner and Kleidon, 1996) , disclosure requirements (Biddle and Suadagaran, 1992; Fuerst, 1998; Huddart et al., 1999) , and minority shareholder protection (Coffee 1999 (Coffee , 2002 Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge et al., 2003; Lee, 2003; Benos and Weisbach, 2004 ) make the selection of trading venue relevant. Most firms choose to have their equity securities traded on their respective domestic market. The literature observes that firms that also choose to subsequently list their equity in foreign markets realize substantive valuation gains.
1 Such gains are generally attributed to the reduction of the super risk premium associated with the disadvantaged characteristics of the home equity market.
A growing literature documents substantial long-run abnormal performance before and after major corporate events, including listing changes among domestic equity markets (e.g., Nasdaq to NYSE) and new equity issuance. 2 These studies detect the presence of abnormal returns several years before and after such major events. Although there is some debate about whether the abnormal performance is consistent with explicit market timing, there is substantial evidence that the valuation effects during the periods surrounding major corporate events are unusual. By extension, we hypothesize that the decision to list firm equity abroad may be associated with valuation effects similar to those observed among firms that list their shares on new domestic exchanges or raise new equity. If returns surrounding an event such as a foreign market listing are abnormal, studies that use return data or market multiples from this period are likely to experience substantial bias in their estimate of equilibrium effects.
Using a comprehensive, hand-collected sample of 764 firms from 35 countries with 1256 overseas listings placed in 24 foreign host markets as of 1998, we add to the above 1 For instance, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find a 28% drop in the local market beta across all foreign firms crosslisted in the U.S., while Errunza and Miller (2000) report that foreign firms listed in the U.S. experience an 11.4 percentage point decrease in their cost of capital.
2 Sanger and McConnell (1986) , McConnell and Sanger (1987) and Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) report abnormal returns around changes in domestic equity listing, while Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Ritter (1991) , and Loughran and Ritter (1995) around new equity offerings. Foerster and Karolyi (2000) observe long-run abnormal returns prior to and following global equity offerings. Also, Henderson et al. (2004) observe strong market timing evidence among international debt and equity issuers.
literature in several important ways. Using a wide event window comprised of 120 months prior to the listing and 120 months after the listing, we find that firms experience a substantial pre-listing run-up and a profound post-listing decline in their returns over longer periods of time than previously known. The run-up starts several years before the listing and the decline continues up to several years after the listing. Controlling for the temporary effects, we document a modest but significant reduction in firm risk-adjusted returns during the five-to-ten year period following the listing relative to the equivalent pre-listing period and attribute this to a permanent change in the firm cost of capital. We estimate that the average decline in risk premium is 2.5 percentage points for the entire sample of cross-listings and is about 5.9
percentage points for non-U.S. stocks listed in the U.S.
Second, this paper is among the first to explicitly control for the sequence of a firm's foreign listing behavior. 3 Studies that only look at the valuation effects of listings on one market, such as the U.S. market, are unable to discriminate the effects of first listings from those of follow-on listings. In such a context, for instance, the 1997 ADR listings on the NYSE of French telecommunication companies Alcatel and France Telecom would be considered equivalent, despite that at the time Alcatel stock was already listed on six other foreign markets while France Telecom was concurrently listed only in Paris. We expect that the motives and gains for follow-on foreign listings are very different from initial foreign listings. If there are diminishing gains to foreign listing, then ceteris paribus one would expect the most profound response to be associated with a firm's first overseas listing. Since almost 40% of our dataset includes firms with more than one overseas listing, we are able to initiate some evidence on the effects of listing sequence on returns. Our tests suggest that the first listing is associated with unique transitory valuation effects but that unique permanent valuation effects are uncertain.
Existing studies focus on valuation effects of non-U.S. firms listing in the U.S. market or to a lesser extent on U.S. firms listing outside the United States. The widely accepted perception is that the U.S. market provides unique gains to foreign firms listed on its exchanges (e.g., Doidge et al., 2003) . Any study that deals with a single (few) host market(s) for listings 3 The only paper that we are aware of which attempts to disentangle the effects of listing sequencing is that of Howe and Kelm (1987) . The authors examine listings of U.S. firms on four overseas markets. As a result of small and non-representative sample, they fail to find any substantial sequencing effects. More importantly, they find no positive abnormal returns before listings or negative abnormal returns after listings, thus contradicting many earlier and later studies. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) test for sequence effects in the announcement returns associated with global equity offerings. They find a modest and statistically insignificant decline in the announcement returns with subsequent offerings.
is unable to compare the valuation gains from cross listing in the U.S. with those that could potentially be present in other markets. No paper to date has examined in a holistic manner the richer tests available with the global universe of listing venue decisions. Since foreign listings in the U.S. constitute only 27% of our sample, we are able to examine the performance of firms originating not only from or listed in the U.S. but also from and in other markets. More importantly, our global sample of cross-listings allows us to relate valuation differences across firms listed in different foreign countries to various market-wide and firm-level characteristics.
We show that there are other markets besides the U.S. that provide sizable gains to cross-listed firms. We observe that host market characteristics such as large market size, greater liquidity, more stringent disclosure requirements, and better legal protection all play a positive role in reducing the long-term capital costs of cross-listed firms. We also find that valuation gains are highly correlated with cross-market familiarity variables, especially the home market exports to the host market. This implies that the presence in foreign product markets has important implications on cross-listed firms. Contrary to the conventional notion that cross-listed firms achieve cost of capital gains through diversification, we find that firms that list across markets with low return correlation experience negative improvements in their cost of capital. After accounting for cross-market characteristics, there is no evidence that the U.S. provides any unique short-or long-term gains to foreign firms listed on its exchanges.
At the firm level, we also observe that firms producing tradable output experience greater valuation gains. This implies that trade has an important effect, in that firms that are relatively more familiar to foreign investors before the listing benefit more by the listing. We find less valuation effects around the listings for large firms -the result which may speak in favor of more efficient pricing of those firms.
Thus, our findings contribute not only to cross-listing literature but also to the growing list of studies that document a profound impact of familiarity preference in general and information flows in particular on behavior and performance of both investors and firms. 4 In this respect, we also support Merton's (1997) investor recognition hypothesis but offer a new interpretation of its relevance to the valuation of cross-listed stocks. In contrast to the arguments in Baker et al. (2002 ), Lang et al. (2003 , Ahearne et al. (2001) , overseas listings may not generate information flow. Rather, firms gain only from foreign listing when the foreign market information environment is already sufficient to induce an increase in firms' investor pool. This conclusion is consistent with the notion that overseas listings reflect rather than overcome information barriers across markets, corroborating the results in Kang and Stulz (1997) and Sarkissian and Schill (2003) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample of overseas listings, return data, as well as methodological issues. Section 3 is devoted to the examination of market timing and cost of capital effects across different home and host markets for listings and listing sequencing. Section 4 reviews the perceived motives for issuing shares in foreign markets and analyzes the relation between the valuation effects of subsequent overseas listings and market-wide characteristics. Section 5 reports the valuation effects of cross-listings with respect to firm characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Listing and return data
We survey the world stock exchanges to identify the universe of foreign listed equities at the end of 1998. In constructing our sample, we excluded investment funds or trusts as well as firms from countries with unreliable or limited financial data and corporate tax havens, such as the Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Jersey, and others. We use stock exchange, financial institution, public sources, or in some cases the firms themselves to identify listing dates. We restrict our sample to those firms for which we also have return data from CRSP or Datastream within 120 months of the listing date. This selection procedure gives us 1256 foreign listings from 764 firms. The sample is broad and balanced with no country contributing more than 20% of the listing firms. We know of no other study that includes a more comprehensive sample of overseas listings and returns. Moreover, we do not require that the first foreign listing is preceded by a domestic listing.
Some firms in our sample list on foreign exchanges before listing in their home market. This phenomenon is particularly strong among Canadian and Israeli firms.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of overseas listings based on the listing number across four calendar periods : before 1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-1998 . We provide the frequency of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and the sixth and higher number listings. The listing number is determined based on the actual available listing dates as of 1998.
For instance, if the return data for some firm with multiple listings is available only starting with the second listing, the second listing is considered as a second listing in our dataset and no first listing appears in the sample.
Since the latest period in our sample coincides with a high cross-listing activity throughout the world, and due to survivorship bias, it is not unexpected to find that the largest number of listings (640 out of 1256) is placed on foreign exchanges in the 1990s. 
Methodological issues
To estimate the impact of foreign listings on the cost of capital, we employ a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we compute a times series of residual returns for each firm listing for all available months around the event window. 5 We compute residual returns based on three common market risk models namely,
Model 2:
Model 3: Forester and Karolyi (1999) report that the median difference between the announcement and listing dates of foreign firms in the U.S. is 44 days while the proportion of these firms that had announcement dates 100 or more days before listing is negligibly small. Since our analysis covers an extended period before and after the listing date, any effect from the listing announcement will be reflected in the stock return pattern immediately before the listing. 6 It is important to note that any model-based computation of residual returns is likely to be misspecified around listing dates. It is unclear if domestic market betas represent the entire risk of firms that are about to be crosslisted in a foreign market. Errunza and Miller (2000) point out, for example, that when firms start listing abroad, some market-wide liberalization processes can also be simultaneously taking place. This concern may be especially relevant for firms with multiple listings since they are among the largest and well-known companies in their respective countries.
allow the coefficients to absorb the cost of capital changes, our second stage tests have no power. We recognize that this restriction assumes that the only systematic changes in cost of capital over the extended event window are due to the foreign listing. We provide some tests of this important assumption in Section 3.1. Alternatively, we could follow Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and others and first estimate market betas in models (1-3) over the earliest pre-listing period and then use these estimates in computing residual returns in the next periods. We do not take this path because it substantially shortens our observation period.
In the second stage, we regress the residual returns on various market, sequence, and firm characteristics to identify the magnitude and cause of any changes in firm returns. In testing the impact of these characteristics, we use the following general regression setup, omitting the time and firm subscripts, 
where e is the series of residual returns from models (1, 2, or Figure 1 shows the annualized moving-average of gross and residual returns over the +/-120-month window around the listing date for all the listings in our sample. The residual returns are computed based on the local-market model (Model 1). To annualize the monthly return series we average the monthly returns across firms in event time and then cumulate the aggregate returns over months t-12 to t+11, where t is the listing month, and divide by two.
Firm Return Performance around Listing
Aggregate performance
Both gross and residual returns show a similar pattern composed of four periods. In the first period, ending about five years before the listing date, the residual returns fluctuate around the zero return mark. In the second period, within approximately five years before the listing, there is a profound increase in both gross and residual returns. On average, the annualized gross return rises from about 10% to 20%. This effect is consistent with the documented increases in returns in other long-run performance studies (see Table 1 ). The third period covers the interval from the time of listing to about five years after the listing. During this period, we notice a profound and steep decline in returns. At its minimum, the annualized gross return is about 7%. However, after the initial large decline, returns increase and generally level off during the last period between five and ten years after the listing. Note that the residual return series suggests that the level of returns in the fourth period is markedly lower than that in the first period. Although this decline in the range of two-three percent is clearly visible, it is much smaller than the change in returns between periods 2 and 3.
To examine the above patterns in statistical terms, we regress monthly residual returns from the three market models on dummy variables associated with the four relative periods suggested by Figure 1 . We report our results in Table 3 . 7 In Panel A we use an extreme skip period in our cost of capital tests; we break periods 1 and 2 at month -60 and break periods 3 and 4 at month +59. The first regression in Panel A compares the difference between the average residual return of periods 2, 3, and 4 to that of the first period (t-120 to t-60). The regression coefficient indicates that in Period 2 the average monthly return is 0.42% per month (5.0% a year) higher than in the preceding period. This increase in returns is followed by an almost equally strong decline during the first 60 months after the listing. The average monthly residual return in Period 3 is lower by 0.36% per month (4.3% a year) than during Period 1. In the last period (starting 60 months after the listing), the average return is smaller in magnitude but still negative and statistically significant relative to Period 1. The coefficient on the Period 4 dummy is -0.21% per month or -2.5% per year. We interpret this estimate as the average cost of capital reduction for a cross-listed firm in our sample.
In the second regression in Panel A, we shift the reference period from Period 1 to Period 2. Our interest is to replicate the tests of other studies that measure the effect of overseas listing on the cost of capital using a smaller event window. The results indicate that the prelisting increase in residual returns is a distinct phenomenon. The residual returns during this period are statistically higher than during all other valuation periods. If we presume that the difference in returns between Period 2 and Period 3 measures listing-induced change in cost of capital, the magnitude of the change is much greater as indicated by the coefficient on the Period 3 dummy variable of -0.79% or -9.5% annually. Note that at least some of the prelisting run-up in prices is fully in line with the notion that in the anticipation for a firm to become less segmented from the world market, the firm's higher prices reflect lower expected returns and the decrease in the future cost of capital. However, a substantial and sustained underperformance of cross-listed stocks after the listing that lasts three to five years is also consistent with a "window of opportunity" explanation of the returns in periods 2 and 3. The returns within three to five years of an overseas listing may reflect both timing effects as well as reductions in the cost of capital. The inability to disentangle these two effects motivates cost of capital tests that use an extended skip period.
In regressions 3 and 4 of Panel A, we repeat the regression 1 specification with other market benchmark adjustments. The inferences are similar with the different models. The only difference we note is a marginal decrease in the magnitude and significance of the Period 4 coefficient, suggesting that the cost of capital may be even less than the annual decline of 2.5%.
We recognize that skipping ten years of data may appear an overly aggressive solution to the measurement problem. In Panel B we reduce the skip period to six years by extending Period 1 to month t-37 and Period 4 to month t-36. This specification causes a dramatic increase in the magnitude of the estimated cost of capital gain. The Period 4 coefficient increases in absolute value by more than 75% from -0.21% to -0.37% for the Model 1 regressions. In Panel C we increase the skip period to 12 years by reducing Period 1 to month t-85 and Period 4 to month t-84. With the longer skip period, the coefficient on the Period 4 dummy across the three models is not materially different from the respective coefficients in Panel A. The standard errors, however, increase substantially.
Based on the results from the various event windows and market adjustment models, we conclude that the 120-month skip period is the best specification for reducing the probability of capturing abnormal return behavior and minimizing the reduction in power caused by the reduction in data. For the results presented in the remainder of this paper, we report only tests done with the local market model (Model 1) and the 120-month skip period. We have conducted the tests using the other specifications as well. Although the choice of the market model makes little difference, the results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the skip period length.
As a final specification test, we test the changes in market risk over the event window.
In evaluating the time variation in market risk, our concern is not for changes in risk between Period 2 and 3, since any systematic changes in market risk over that period are most likely due to the effect of the foreign listing. The more important question is whether our sample experiences systematic changes in market risk over either the pre-event period or the post-event period. If this is the case, our long skip period may result in a comparison of returns for assets that are in fact fundamentally very different. To test this, we perform the following regression: 
Due to the test specification, the coefficients in this regression are the same as if the sample was divided into pre-listing and post-listing sub-samples. In this regression b is -0.0057 with a t-statistic of -0.25. Also, we observe almost no changes in the home market beta from the pre-to the post-listing period. Therefore, we conclude that the 120-month skip period specification does not suffer from problems due to systematic changes in market risk.
Performance across markets and listing sequence
In this section we examine the differences in return patterns around the listing by home and host markets, as well as by listing order sequence. We begin by highlighting differences in return patterns for three subsets of listings: the listings of US firms abroad, the listings of non-US firms in the U.S., and the listings of non-US firms on markets outside the U.S. Figure 2 depicts the annualized residual returns for three subsets of listings and the corresponding observation frequencies (shown in the lower part of the figure). The number of firm-listingmonth observations is always greater than 50. Since the CRSP return data is available for a much longer time series, the number of observations for the U.S. firm sub-sample is less affected by the extended event window. The return plot shows that the general pattern in returns around an overseas listing that we described earlier is also present at the disaggregate level, although relative magnitudes vary across markets. Foreign firms that list in the U.S.
experience the largest pre-listing increase in residual return reaching about 25% per year. In comparison, the maximum level of annualized residual returns for foreign listings outside the U.S. is less than 10% per year. The post-listing decline in returns is again markedly steeper for listings in the U.S. than for the other two groups of listings. Second, we examine the impact of the listing sequence. Studies that only look at the cost of capital effects of listings on one market, such as the U.S. market, consider all such listings the same. If there are diminishing gains to foreign listing, then ceteris paribus one would expect the most profound response to be associated with a firm's first overseas listing.
Since the motives and gains for subsequent foreign listings may be very different from initial listings we expect that it is important to control for a firm's listing sequence. We emphasize again that our sample is not immune from the survivorship bias and so the sequencing documented in our study presents the effects of a relative sequence of overseas listings not an absolute sequence. To test the statistical significance of the return patterns we follow the analysis of Table   3 but add additional market variables as provided in Equation (4) using host market model (Model 1) and the 120-month skip period. Table 4 presents these results. In Panel A, we show the results of two regressions. The first regression provides the information on the relative performance around the listing of US firms listed overseas and non-US firms listed in the U.S. Figure 2 , we find that the pre-listing run-up is particularly acute for firms listing in the U.S. with monthly residual Period 2 returns of 0.62% greater than those listed on other markets. Foreign listings of US firms are associated with particularly poor Period 2 monthly returns of 0.37% lower than in other markets. We find no statistical cross-sectional differences in Period 3 returns. Regression 1 also provides evidence on the cross-sectional differences in cost of capital gains. We find that the statistically significant reduction in the Period 4 returns is unique to the US-hosted firms with coefficient of -0.50% per month or -6.0% per year. The overall Period 4 coefficient is an insignificant -0.05%.
Consistent with
To examine whether this finding is specific to the U.S. or is more generally a largemarket effect, we perform a similar regression (Regression 2) but substitute a G5 country (France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and the U.S.) dummy, for the U.S. dummy in Regression 1.
The estimation results provide a remarkably different picture. The overall coefficients are now similar to those for the full sample of data as in Table 3 . As a group, the G5 countries do not appear to provide significant cost of capital gains to foreign firms listed on their exchanges.
The interactive G5-period-4 coefficient of -0.01% is insignificantly different from zero. The U.S. effect does not appear at first glance to be a large-market effect.
The U.S. has attracted the largest number of new overseas listings in the 1990s, including a substantial number of first-time listings. To investigate the potential impact of listing sequencing on valuation differences across markets, we include a dummy variable that captures the first-listing effect. These results are presented in Panel B of Table 4 . The first regression shows that the Period 2 run-up is particularly important and possibly unique to first listings. The first listing Period 2 coefficient is 0.48% higher than that for the subsequent listings. We also find that the first listing is associated with substantially greater post-listing abnormal performance. The first listing Period 3 coefficient is 0.32% lower than that for the subsequent listings. The first listing does not appear to be associated with statistically significant differences in cost of capital effects. The first listing Period 4 coefficient is -0.17 with a t-statistic of -1.07. In the second regression of Panel B, we observe that the U.S. host market survives a first listing control variable. The Period 4 return reduction is -0.47% per month over non-US-hosted listings. We also note that even after controlling for the first listing, the Period 2 increase in residual returns is still highly significant for the US-hosted listings.
Finally, in the third regression of the panel, we again observe that even after controlling for the first listing, the G5 countries as a group do not provide any specific cost of capital advantages to foreign firms cross-listed on their exchanges nor do domestic G5 firms experience any unique benefits from being listed abroad. 8 We have found that the U.S. market is unique among the largest economies in its impact on the reduction in the cost of capital of cross-listed firms. In Table 5 we test whether the U.S. effect is common among other large foreign listing markets. The table shows the results of a single regression in which we incorporate country specific dummy variables for the nine largest host markets for listings (markets hosting more than 30 listings). In this regression we also control for the first listing. In addition to the G5 group of countries, the large foreign listing hosts are all European countries, namely, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Possibly due to the large number of coefficients being estimated in this regression, most of the slope estimates in the table are insignificant. We do find that besides the U.S., firms listing in Belgium, which hosts 59 listings, also appear to generate significant reductions cost of capital. Although not significant, the large Period 4 point estimates associated with foreign listings in France, Switzerland, and the U.K., -46%, -0.47%, and -0.39% per month, respectively, are economically sizable. Although again insignificant, the 8 Note that the first listing sample in Period 4 contains a larger proportion of US firms than in periods 2 and 3. This is because many first listings from outside the U.S. have occurred during the 1990's, resulting in fewer observations over the five-to-ten year period after the listing (see lower plots of Figures 2 and 3) . Therefore, we have also estimated the cost of capital advantages of the first listing separately for US and non-US firms. For US firms the cost of capital gains associated with the first listing are insignificant and practically indistinguishable from higher order listings. For non-US firms, we observe a substantial economic significance of the first listing: the reduction in the cost of capital is 0.57% per month (6.8% a year). However, due to the smaller sample size, we are unable to support this finding in statistical terms. These results are available on request.
Period 4 point estimate for Luxembourg would indicate a particularly poor cost of capital gain for firms that list in that country. We do not find an obvious pattern in the countries that is consistent with the estimated cost of capital effects reported in Table 5 . We investigate more closely the effect of market characteristics on cost of capital gains in the next section.
Finally, we recall from Panel E of Table 1 that many firms place subsequent listings within a relatively short time period (about three years) of earlier listings. This implies, to a certain degree, an overlap in returns with the earlier listings. Our concern is that the t-statistics presented are upwardly biased because we are assuming observation independence when in fact the same firm returns may be highly overlapping. To decouple the listing sequencing effect from other effects, we exclude all sample listings that occur within five years of an earlier listing. This procedure reduces the overall sample by about 50%. In unreported results using this non-overlapping sample we find that the results are similar.
Return Performance and Relative Market Characteristics
Why listing venue matters
In a frictionless world market, firms are indifferent to the trading venue of their securities. Yet, in contrast to the notion of market irrelevance, firms overwhelmingly choose to initially list their equity for trading on the respective domestic exchange. 9 We suppose that cross-border barriers in listing requirements and information flow largely explain such behavior. Many firms choose to subsequently list their equity in foreign markets. The interest in choosing to list in foreign market can be explained by gains to overcoming capital and informational barriers as well as foreign market superiority in liquidity, tax treatment, disclosure, and containment of shareholder expropriation risk. Our global sample of cross-listings allows us to test the relative importance of each of the potential motives. We begin with a review of the literature for each of these motives.
Cross-border barriers to investment capital. Based on the international asset pricing models of Black (1974 ), Solnik (1974 ), Stulz (1981 , a large number of papers argue that international 9 See Blass and Yafeh (2001) for documentation of some exceptions.
investing provides large diversification gains.
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If investors are restricted for investing overseas, firms gain from the premium that investors are willing to pay for restricted foreign securities, Errunza and Losq (1985) . With cross-border trading friction, overseas investors are most interested in capital from markets that will minimize their portfolio risk. Consequently, firms may capture the premium that foreign investors are willing to pay for equity from markets with little correlation to their home market. 11 Other things equal, firms should realize the greatest cost of capital gain by selecting those host markets whose returns are least correlated with the home market.
Cross-border barriers to information flow. Merton (1987) Sarkissian and Schill (2003) argue however that a foreign listing is not sufficient to overcome cross-border information or familiarity barriers. Rather they find that firms tend to list in those foreign markets where the information barriers are already low; for example, countries that share large trade, cultural ties, and similar industrial structure with their home market, and are close geographically. In earlier papers, Mittoo (1992) and Saudagaran (1988) show that overseas listing decisions are connected with product market trade. We examine both of these information-based hypotheses with two sets of variables. If overseas listings overcome information barriers, we expect that cross-listing valuation gains will be greatest for listings in the relatively largest markets. If the foreign listing does not affect information flow, cross listings will generate the best gains when the foreign-market information about the firm and the home country is already relatively large.
Market differences in liquidity.
Overseas listings may be placed abroad in a search for greater liquidity. Many papers find that foreign firms listed in the U.S. achieve significantly lower bidask spread (e.g., Tinic and West, 1974; Domowitz et al., 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Werner and Kleidon, 1996) . Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) document that liquidity plays an important role in the ability of markets to attract trading volume. If increased liquidity is important in the listing decision, we expect that those foreign markets that provide the greatest improvement in liquidity will generate the largest gains in cost of capital.
Market differences in disclosure. Biddle and Suadagaran (1992) find that more difficult disclosure standards in a given country hinder the access of foreign firms to that market. Fuerst Tax advantages. Firms may prefer listing in countries with low-tax trading environments for both companies and investors. Sarkissian and Schill (2003) show that firms from markets with heavy corporate and personal tax burdens are attracted to issuing their equity in tax-haven countries. Since tax havens are usually small countries with insignificant investor pool and often dubious disclosure standards, we expect that listing in these markets will not materially impact the cost of capital of cross-listed firms.
Return performance and home-host market characteristics
We use aggregate economic, equity market, exchange listing standards, and investor protection measure for the 35 countries in our sample. Our measure of domestic market size is the total equity market capitalization (CAP). Our liquidity measure is the same as in Domowitz et al. To summarize our proxy variables, we examine the variation in relative market characteristics along the average listing sequence. We regress each of the relative home-host market characteristics on three dummy variables associated with the first, second, and third listing. In this regression each listing is treated as an independent observation. Our results are reported in Table 6 . The intercept of the individual regressions shows the average importance of these characteristics in explaining market choice. We find that on average firms list in smaller markets with better investor protection and disclosure requirements, and in tax havens.
The average correlation between the home and host markets is 0.47. In addition, we observe that firms list in markets, which share large trade, cultural ties, and similar industrial structure with the home market, and are about 5,500 kilometers away from the home market.
The coefficient on the first-listing dummy shows that first listings are quite unique. The results suggest that first listings tend to occur in markets that are larger, more liquid, require greater disclosure, have better legal protection, provide more liberal tax environment, and are relatively less similar in their industrial base. There is no indication that first listings are placed in the markets that are the least correlated with the home market. The two most significant slope coefficients are for our culture and trade variables. This suggests that in making their first decision to list overseas firms choose markets that are familiar to their home market through trade or colonial and language ties. The preference for host markets that share the same culture with the home market remains strong also for the second listing. Curiously, the industry correlation variable is slightly smaller for the first two listings than for subsequent listings.
We now turn to our cross-sectional test of cost of capital gains. First, we run the univariate regressions of residual returns on each of the relative characteristics of the home and host markets to determine the contribution of individual market-wide properties on the cost of capital. Then, we conduct multivariate tests to establish which of the market characteristics has the largest explanatory power for the cross-sectional variability in cost of capital effects. In both of these regression specifications we control for the first listing and calendar effects in a manner similar to regression equation (4). Table 7 shows the results. Again the focus of attention is on the Period 4 coefficients in the last column, which correspond to the extended-term cost of capital gains. Panel A reports the results of univatiate tests. We observe that all significant interactive Period 4 coefficients have the hypothesized sign. In particular, firms attain a reduction in their cost of capital when they list in larger, more liquid, and more stringent markets. However, the slope on the trade variable, EXPORT, has the highest significance among all the coefficients, indicating that firms experience cost of capital gains in those overseas markets which are familiar with their (firms') home market products. In economic terms, each 10% increase in exports to a foreign country by the home country of a firm reduces its cost of capital after listing in that overseas market by 1.5% annually. Interestingly, the coefficient on the diversification proxy, CORRELATION, is highly significant but negative. This implies that firms that list in markets that are weakly correlated with the home market, which presumably can provide higher diversification gains, experience increases rather than decreases in their cost of capital.
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Panel B of Table 7 gives the results of multivariate tests while controlling also for the U.S. host market. Using this setup, we are able to directly test whether strong cost of capital and other valuation effects observed for listings in the U.S. in Table 4 are peculiar only to the U.S. or are driven by the set of cross-market characteristics. We find that all four period coefficients on the U.S. host market dummy are insignificant. This implies that not only the U.S. market provides no extraordinary cost of capital gains to foreign stocks listed on its exchanges but also it leads to no sizable short-term valuation changes. We also observe that the signs of almost all interactive Period 4 coefficients from the multivariate regression coincide with those from univariate regressions. However, only two coefficients are now significant -those on the interactive EXPORT and CORRELATION variables. The coefficient on the trade proxy also has a negative sign and significant at the 5% level, implying that a high amount of trade between the home and host markets for listings helps reduce the cost of capital of cross-listed firms. Note that Sarkissian and Schill (2003) find that economic proximity helps explain the geography of cross-listings among firms from smaller developed and emerging countries better than any other variable. We infer therefore that the most likely markets for listings also provide the largest cost of capital gains.
The coefficient on the diversification proxy is again negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that more highly correlated markets provide more cost of capital gains to cross-listed firms. The negative sign on CORRELATION may be explained by the likelihood of markets with greater trade to also maintain greater return correlation. To test the effect of CORRELATION we rerun the regression without CORRELATION. As predicted, the sign on EXPORT increases in magnitude to -0.0112 and becomes significant at the 1% level.
14 therefore represents the most suitable legal measure for our study. 13 We do not imply here however that more correlated countries are necessarily more integrated. 14 One concern with the Panel B results is that the market characteristics may vary over time. Although we would like to improve the timeliness of our right-hand side variables to match the market characteristics at the event time, data availability prohibits such variable collection. However, we can test the importance of this concern by trimming our sample to only those listings that occur within a reasonable time of the market characteristic estimation. We conduct our multivariate estimation based on the listings that occur in the 1990s but find no qualitative differences with the full sample estimation. As before, the only significant at the 5% level market characteristic that explains the cross-sectional variability in cost of capital effects is the trade variable. These results are available on request.
Thus, we reject the barriers to investment explanation since investors do not appear to be willing to pay a premium for capital from markets with weak correlation to their own.
These results are consistent with those of Sarkissian and Schill (2003) who argue that firms list in familiar and therefore empirically more correlated markets. Furthermore, we find no indication that the U.S. market has any unique benefits for cross-listed stocks. Our results suggest that the trade argument, which can be considered as one of the familiarity motives for cross-listing decisions, provides the best explanation of foreign listing returns in the long run.
An extensive presence in foreign product markets increases the host country investor familiarity about the home market. Cross-listings by firms in those host markets provide further impetus to the already existing awareness about them on the part of foreign investors.
This knowledge helps increase investor pool leading to the observed valuation gains, consistent with Merton (1987). Kang and Stulz (1997) and Sarkissian and Schill (2003) argue that overseas listings reflect rather than reduce the information barriers that lead to investor home bias in international investment. Kang and Stulz find that foreign ownership increases with firm size and exports.
15
Return Performance and Firm Characteristics
Sarkissian and Schill suggest that the wider international familiarity associated with large firms and those that produce tradable output allow these firms greater flexibility in their choice of foreign listing market. If such firm characteristics affect foreign ownership and foreign market choice, it is likely that such characteristics also affect the associated cost of capital gain. We test the cross-sectional affects of firm size and output tradability on our return measures to see if larger firms and those producing tradable output generate larger cost of capital reductions.
We classify firms into tradable and non-tradable by their industry following Sarkissian and Schill (2003) . There are eight tradable industries, chemicals, consumer goods (including food), electronics (including electrical equipment and computers), manufacturing, healthcare (i.e., pharmaceuticals, drugs, biotechnology), mining, oil and gas, and paper (including forestry 15 It is also known that competition in product markets has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g., see Hart, 1983) . Therefore, potentially, we could not exclude the possibility that the observed cost of capital reduction among some cross-listed firms is not due to the abilities of the managers of those firms in making their operations more efficient. However, since we found no significant changes in the firms' domestic markets risk exposure between Periods 3 and 4, we conclude that cost of capital reduction is achieved due to the listing event itself. 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-1998 . The ranking of firm sizes prior to 1970 is based on all the preceding years. We construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one for large firms.
We repeat the Table 3 experiment by adding the two firm characteristics to our regression models and present the test results in Table 8 . We present the test results on output tradability in Regression 1. We find that tradable firms underperform non-tradable firms in In the third regression of Table 8 we examine the importance of the two firm-specific characteristics while controlling for the major host and home markets for listings and listing sequencing. The overall results are qualitatively very similar to those based on the first two regressions and are consistent with the investor familiarity arguments of Kang and Stulz (1997) and Sarkissian and Schill (2003) .
Conclusions
We use a comprehensive sample of global listings across all geographic regions to analyze the long-run valuation effects around foreign-listing date. We find strong evidence of transitory and permanent valuation effects. Overseas listings are associated with a substantial pre-listing run-up and a profound post-listing decline in firm returns that generally take place about five years before and after the listing. We detect significant cost of capital reduction five to ten years following the listing relative to the equivalent pre-listing period.
We find that initial foreign listings are associated with large transitory abnormal returns around the listing, and economically significant cost of capital gains over the five-to-ten year period after the listing. We provide modest evidence that there are diminishing gains to overseas listings. One possible explanation for this effect is that with each overseas listing, a given firm becomes increasingly more integrated with the world market, making the impact of each subsequent listing less important than the previous listing.
We find that the U.S. market is not unique for cross-listed stocks: other markets provide similar economically sizable cost of capital gains to foreign firms listed on their exchanges.
We further show that valuation patterns vary widely with different home and host markets for securities, as well as firm characteristics. It appears that although gains from increasing the size of the investor pool, liquidity, disclosure, and investor protection maintain some role, firms generate the greatest cost of capital gain when listing in markets with which there is large cross-product market trade. We further observe that firms producing tradable output experience substantial cost of capital reduction, which implies that firms that are relatively more known to foreign investors before the listing benefit more after the listing. Contrary to the conventional notion of international diversification in segmented markets, firms that list across markets with low return correlation experience relatively little to negative gains in their cost of capital. The table shows the distribution of sample return data within the period of +/-120 months around listing months by respective home countries. Number of months refers to the total number of unique calendar months in the sample of returns. Number of firm-listing-months is the total number of return observations used in the study. Number of firm-months excludes the overlapping returns for firms that list in multiple markets. The first and last month are the first and last calendar month, respectively, in the series of unique months.
Number of months
Number of firmlisting-months a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , where all returns are in US dollars less the return on the 30-day Treasury Bill. D(*) refers to a corresponding dummy variable, such that D(t-120,t-60) is equal to 1 for observations 120 to 60 months prior to the month of the overseas listing date and equal to 0 otherwise. D(Home=G5) and D(Host=G5) indicate whether the listing firm is from a G5 country or was in a G5 market, respectively. G5 countries are France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6 Listing sequencing and market selection
This table shows regression results various host and home market characteristics on the dummies representing the sequencing order of the listing. CORRELATION is the correlation coefficient between the host and home equity market indices over the period 1990 to 1998. MARKET SIZE is the US dollar market capitalization of the host market divided by the capitalization of the home market. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of the host country liquidity to that in the home country as measured by Elkins/McShery. Variables D(...) are dummy variables. D(DISCLOSURE) is set to 1 if the host country has more stringent disclosure requirements than the home country. D(TAX) is set to 1 if the host country is considered a tax haven. D(LAW) is set to 1 if the host country has better legal protection than the home country based on the La Porta et al. (1997) country indexes of the efficiency of judicial system. D(CULTURE) is set to 1 if both the home and the host countries share a common major spoken language or if they were part of the same colonial empire. EXPORT is the percent of exports from the home country going to the host country based on the 1996 UN Statistics Department data. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE is the correlation of the ranked industry distribution of firms listed overseas between each pair of countries. DISTANCE is the great circle distance between capitals of countries the home and host countries in megameters. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , where all returns are in US dollars less the return on the 30-day Treasury Bill. D(*) refers to a corresponding dummy variable, such that D(t-60,t-1) is equal to 1 for observations 60 to 1 month prior to the month of the overseas listing date and equal to 0 otherwise. CORRELATION is the correlation between the host and home equity markets. MARKET SIZE is the relative size of the host market equity capitalization divided by the market equity capitalization of the home market. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of the host country liquidity to that in the home country as measured by Elkins/McShery. D(DISCLOSURE) is set to 1 if the host country has more stringent disclosure requirements than the home country. D(TAX) is set to 1 if the host country is considered a tax haven. D(LAW) is set to 1 if the host country has better legal protection than the home country based on the La Porta et al. (1997) country indexes of the efficiency of judicial system. D(CULTURE) is set to 1 if both the home and the host countries share a common major spoken language or if they were part of the same colonial empire. EXPORT is the percent of exports from the home country going to the host country based on the 1996 UN Statistics Department data. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE is the correlation of the ranked industry distribution of firms listed overseas between each pair of countries. DISTANCE is the great circle distance between capitals of countries the home and host countries in megameters. D(Host=US) indicate whether the firm is listed in the U.S. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , where all returns are in US dollars less the return on the 30-day Treasury Bill. D(*) refers to a corresponding dummy variable, such that D(t-60,t-1) is equal to 1 for observations 60 to 1 month prior to the month of the overseas listing date and equal to 0 otherwise. Firm tradability is defined on an industry classification of the exportability of the firm's output. Small firms are those whose market capitalization is below the monthly median for all overseas listing firms within the sample period and within the same G5 classification. In the regression an array of monthly calendar time dummy variables from February 1926 to December 2001 is also included but the coefficient estimates are not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
